Showing posts with label 1911. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1911. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

"Reason and Religion": LDS Thoughts from a Century Ago

The following article, written by Aubrey Parker of Gateshead-on-Tyne, Tyne and Wear, England, originally appeared as "Reason and Religion", The Latter-day Saints' Millennial Star 73/30 (27 July 1911); 477-478.  
The true religion is easily discernible, because it is in every respect compatible with true reason.  If religion has to satisfy the whole soul of man, it must satisfy his reason - for reason is an integral part of the human soul.
Men laugh and jeer at the origin of the faith of the Latter-day Saints, and call it "fraud."  But our claim for it is that it is the supernatural origin of a supernatural religion.  Had it a natural origin, compatible with the modern conception of religious inceptions, it would not be a supernatural religion and hence not true.  The miraculous has for ever been an essential part of true religion.
The true religion will ultimately "win home."  The devolution of false religion is resulting in the evolution of the true religion.  The gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ is essentially and eternally true.  Were every whit of scripture, ancient and modern, destroyed, the gospel of Christ would still be - for it is the everlasting gospel.  The gospel is of God, it is eternal and infinite, independent alike of time or place.  There are many forms of religion, all originating in the desire of man to worship a supreme being.  The "many sects" taken collectively have many of the principles of the true religion.  But not one of them has all these principles, though all have some, and it is by that they exist.
People are taught to look upon God in much the same way as they look upon electricity.  No one knows what electricity is, but nearly every one comes in touch with its uses in their daily life.  They study the dynamo and the motor conductors through which it manifests itself.  So, say they, it is with God.  You handle nature's gifts, and through all of these God manifests Himself.  Yet He Himself is a mysterious essence, which you may not conceive or comprehend, for in so doing you would confound Him with the grossness of the material.  Is this view a reasonable one?  Is it scriptural?  If it is reasonable or scriptural, then we have grounds for holding that view; but if it is neither one nor the other, then we should not enterain or hold it.  It is written in the Holy Bible, "This is life eternal, to know thee the only true God."  Then God is knowable.  Is it within the realm of reason to worship a God "whom ye know not?"  St. Paul sought to teach the Athenians to worship the true God in place of "an unknown God." 
Many men taboo reason as altogether alien to the true spirit of religion.  They declare in horror at him who would reason his way in religion.  "You would limit God to your own little mind," or "You would make unto yourself a material God."  True it is that a man's God can be no bigger than his conception of Him.  But is it reasonable to suppose that the God of Heaven, who Himself comprehends all things, is Himself incomprehensible?
God honors intelligent worship, and only they that worship Him in truth can worship thus.  "The glory of God is intelligence."  Reason is one of God's own attributes and He loves and honors it in His children.  "Truth is reason," and God's word is truth, and truth it is that makes us free: God's freemen. 
Some questions for reflection/discussion:
  1. Parker in this piece makes an argument for the compatibility of reason and religion: True religion addresses a person's totality as a holistic self; what addresses a holistic self, addresses the rational faculties of that holistic self; and therefore, true religion addresses the rational faculties of that holistic self.  What implications does this have for evaluating religious systems?  How does Parker employ it?
  2. Parker professes that, because compatibility with true reason is a necessary feature of true religion, it is therefore easy to discern which religion is true.  Is this the case in your experience?  Is there perhaps something to what Parker is saying here?
  3. Parker argues, against some critics of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, that it is perfectly reasonable that a religion that lays claim to supernatural realities, should have an origin likewise bound up with supernatural realities.  What sort of critics might Parker have in mind here?
  4. Parker claims that, even if all scripture were obliterated, it would not change the truth of the gospel of Jesus Christ.  This, of course, is strictly true.  But what about the epistemic impact of such an occurrence?  What function does scripture have?  
  5. Parker opposes a common view of God that, he claims, views God as analogous to electricity.  What sort of view does Parker seem to have in mind?  Is this a fair assessment of that view?  Why or why not? 
  6. Parker seems to object to mainstream Christian views of God on two main fronts (though they seem to be related in his mind).  First, he charges that affirmation of divine incomprehensibility makes God completely unknowable and therefore not a possible object of genuine worship, which is contrary to both reason and scripture.  Second, as a subsidiary point, he seems to claim that only an inherently material God could avoid being a vague and totally unknowable being.  Has Parker really understood the dynamics of 'incomprehensibility'-language as it actually functions in mainstream Christian discourse?  Do mainstream Christians typically act in their religious lives as though God is a complete unknown, whether by reason or revelation?  Is Parker's assessment of immaterialist views of God fair to the actual beliefs of mainstream Christians who believe in divine incorporeality?  
  7. Parker scoffs at those who "declare in horror at him who would reason his way in religion".  Today, and indeed sometimes in his own day, many Latter-day Saints uphold just such a "taboo", charging that reason is merely the fallback of those who deny direct personal revelation and the guidance of modern prophets, and that it is 'worldly' rather than 'spiritual'.  (I have, for my own part, met quite a number of such Latter-day Saints.)  What might Parker say to them within his own church?  
  8. Parker says that, when it comes to religious views, there are two critical questions that we must ask: "Is this view a reasonable one?  Is it scriptural?  If it is reasonable or scriptural, then we have grounds for holding that view; but if it is neither one nor the other, then we should not enterain or hold it."  What sort of religious epistemology does this imply?  What persons or movements in the religious world today most strongly advocate for Parker's view here?
  9. In his last paragraph, Parker quotes from both D&C 93:36 and also the LDS hymn "O My Father".  He says that reason is an attribute of God himself, and so it is something he loves to find in us as well, because it reflects him.  Furthermore, truth is always a reasonable thing; reason leads toward truth, not away from it.  What might it look like for a religious community to really seek to embody this view in the way it conducts its religious life? 

Tuesday, January 7, 2014

G. K. Chesterton on Mormonism and Religious Understanding

During a significant portion of the first half of the twentieth century, noted Christian author G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936) had a weekly newspaper column that appeared in The Illustrated London News.  Many of these columns are worth reading today even if simply for a taste of Chesterton's infamous wit.  In the column that he had published on 13 May 1911, he treated the subject of Mormonism in response to a speech shortly before given in Nottingham by one Elder Ward.  The 'Elder Ward' in question here is probably (or so I would surmise) Elder Clarence T. Ward (1888-1961) of Boise, Idaho, who in 1911 was serving as the clerk of the Nottingham Conference (see the minutes of the Nottingham semi-annual conference of 5 March 1911, as printed as "Minutes of Nottingham Conference", The Latter-day Saints' Millennial Star 73/10 [9 March 1911]: 150-151; and the minutes of the Nottingham semi-annual conference of 3 September 1911, as printed as "Minutes of Nottingham Conference", The Latter-day Saints' Millennial Star 73/36 [7 September 1911]: 572-573) as part of his mission that lasted from 1910 through January 1912 (see History of Idaho: Gem of the Mountains, 2 vols. [Chicago, IL: S. J. Clarke, 1920], 2:321).

Elder Ward's speech was perhaps a response to a great deal of concern about false rumors of LDS missionaries kidnapping English girls to force them into polygamous marriages in Utah.  Indeed, these rumors led to a government investigation, which was carried out by the Home Secretary of that time, Winston Churchill (1874-1965).  The whole atmosphere has been covered by Peter J. Vousden in his BYU Studies article "The English Editor and the 'Mormon Peril' of 1911", while several years ago the excellent LDS history blog Keep-a-pitchin-in provided some relevant excerpts from the actual parliamentary discussion of the issue ("Winston Churchill Investigates the Mormon Question, 1910-1911").  This is the context for Chesterton's meandering column of 13 May 1911, which uses the controversy as a touchstone for a more sweeping reflection on the need to gain an appreciation for religious ideas and motivations.  Chesterton's column was later reprinted in his The Uses of Diversity: A Book of Essays (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1921), 182-189:
There is inevitably something comic (comic in the broad and vulgar style which all men ought to appreciate in its place) about the panic aroused by the presence of the Mormons and their supposed polygamous campaign in this country.  It calls up the absurd image of an enormous omnibus, packed inside with captive English ladies, with an Elder on the box, controlling his horses with the same patriarchal gravity as his wives, and another Elder as conductor calling out "Higher up," with an exalted and allegorical intonation.  And there is something highly fantastic to the ordinary healthy mind in the idea of any precaution being proposed; in the idea of locking the Duchess in the boudoir and the governess in the nursery, lest they should make a dash for Utah, and become the ninety-third Mrs. Abraham Nye, or the hundredth Mrs. Hiram Boke.  But these frankly vulgar jokes, like most vulgar jokes, cover a popular prejudice which is but the bristly hide of a living principle.  Elder Ward, recently speaking at Nottingham, strongly protested against these rumours, and asserted absolutely that polygamy had never been practised with the consent of the Mormon Church since 1890.  I think it only just that this disclaimer should be circulated; but though it is most probably sincere, I do not find it very soothing.  The year 1890 is not very long ago, and a society that could have practised so recently a custom so alien to Christendom must surely have a moral attitude which might be repellent to us in many other respects.  Moreover, the phrase about the consent of the Church (if correctly reported) has a little the air of an official repudiating responsibility for unofficial excesses.  It sounds almost as if Mr. Abraham Nye might, on his own account, come into church with a hundred and fourteen of his wives, but people were supposed not to notice them.  It might amount to little more than this, that the chief Elder may allow the hundred and fourteen wives to walk down the street like a girls' school, but he is not officially expected to take off his hat to each of them in turn.  Seriously speaking, however, I have little doubt that Elder Ward speaks the substantial truth, and that polygamy is dying, or has died, among the Mormons.  My reason for thinking this is simple: it is that polygamy always tends to die out.  Even in the East I believe that, counting heads, it is by this time the exception rather than the rule.  Like slavery, it is always being started, because of its obvious conveniences.  It has only one small inconvenience, which is that it is intolerable.
Our real error in such a case is that we do not know or care about the creed itself, from which a people's customs, good or bad, will necessarily flow.  We talk much about "respecting" this or that person's religion; but the way to respect a religion is to treat it as a religion: to ask what are its tenets and what are their consequences.  But modern tolerance is deafer than intolerance.  The old religious authorities, at least, defined a heresy before they condemned it, and read a book before they burned it.  But we are always saying to a Mormon or a Moslem - "Never mind about your religion, come to my arms."  To which he naturally replies - "But I do mind about my religion, and I advise you to mind your eye."
About half the history now taught in schools and colleges is made windy and barren by this narrow notion of leaving out the theological theories.  The wars and Parliaments of the Puritans make absolutely no sense if we leave out the fact that Calvinism appeared to them to be the absolute metaphysical truth, unanswerable, unreplaceable, and the only thing worth having in the world.  The Crusades and dynastic quarrels of the Norman and Angevin Kings make absolutely no sense if we leave out the fact that these men (with all their vices) were enthusiastic for the doctrine, discipline, and endowment of Catholicism.  Yet I have read a history of the Puritans by a modern Nonconformist in which the name of Calvin was not even mentioned, which is like writing a history of the Jews without mentioning either Abraham or Moses.  And I have never read any popular or educational history of England that gave the slightest hint of the motives in the human mind that covered England with abbeys and Palestine with banners.  Historians seem to have completely forgotten the two facts - first, that men act from ideas; and second, that it might, therefore, be well to discover which ideas.  The mediaevals did not believe primarily in "chivalry," but in Catholicism, as producing chivalry among other things.  The Puritans did not believe primarily in "righteousness," but in Calvinism, as producing righteousness among other things.  It was the creed that held the coarse or cunning men of the world at both epochs.  William the Conqueror was in some ways a cynical and brutal soldier, but he did attach importance to the fact that the Church upheld his enterprise; that Harold had sworn falsely on the bones of saints, and that the banner above his own lances had been blessed by the Pope.  Cromwell was in some ways a cynical and brutal soldier; but he did attach importance to the fact that he had gained assurance from on high in the Calvinistic scheme; that the Bible seemed to support him - in short, the most important moment in his own life, for him, was not when Charles I lost his head, but when Oliver Cromwell did not lose his soul.  If you leave these things out of the story, you are leaving out the story itself.  If William Rufus was only a red-haired man who liked hunting, why did he force Anselm's head under a mitre, instead of forcing his head under a headsman's axe?  If John Bunyan only cared for "righteousness," why was he in terror of being damned, when he knew he was rationally righteous?  We shall never make anything of moral and religious movements in history until we begin to look at their theory as well as their practice.  For their practice (as in the case of the Mormons) is often so unfamiliar and frantic that it is quite unintelligible without their theory.
I have not the space, even if I had the knowledge, to describe the fundamental theories of Mormonism about the universe.  But they are extraordinarily interesting; and a proper understanding of them would certainly enable us to see daylight through the more perplexing or menacing customs of this community; and therefore to judge how far polygamy was in their scheme a permanent and self-renewing principle or (as is quite probable) a personal and unscrupulous accident.  The basic Mormon belief is one that comes out of the morning of the earth, from the most primitive and even infantile attitude.  Their chief dogma is that God is material, not that He was materialized once, as all Christians believe; nor that He is materialized specially, as all Catholics believe; but that He was materially embodied from all time; that He has a local habitation as well as a name.  Under the influence of this barbaric but violently vivid conception, these people crossed a great desert with their guns and oxen, patiently, persistently, and courageously, as if they were following a vast and visible giant who was striding across the plains.  In other words, this strange sect, by soaking itself solely in the Hebrew Scriptures, had really managed to reproduce the atmosphere of those Scriptures as they are felt by Hebrews rather than by Christians.  A number of dull, earnest, ignorant, black-coated men with chimney-pot hats, chin beards or mutton-chop whiskers, managed to reproduce in their own souls the richness and peril of an ancient Oriental experience.  If we think from this end we may possibly guess how it was that they added polygamy.
Some questions for reflection/discussion:
  1. Chesterton notes that the then-current rumors were that LDS missionaries had come to seduce English women into coming to Utah and becoming polygamous wifes.  Chesterton satirizes these rumors by envisioning outlandish scenarios that multiply wives far beyond anything actually seen in the Utah period and underscore the social respectability of the ladies in their monogamous English lives, thus highlighting the absurdity of moving from the one state of life to the other.  What are some likely reasons why such rumors began to come into existence at all?  Why did so many people find them to be credible?  What social factors were at work?  Why was it so often so difficult for LDS missionaries to dispel such rumors?
  2. Chesterton observes that Elder Ward gave assurances that "polygamy had never been practised with the consent of the Mormon Church since 1890".  Chesterton goes on to say that he finds it quite likely that Elder Ward is being honest, and that this disclaimer should rightly be disseminated to the public.  Historians of polygamy in the post-Manifesto period, however, have shown that there were indeed hundreds of polygamous marriages performed by church authorities after 1890, and that even a majority of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles (as it was then constituted) took additional plural wives after the 1890 Manifesto was issued (see, for instance, discussion in B. Carmon Hardy's book Solemn Covenant: The Mormon Polygamous Passage).  Of course, by the time Elder Ward was speaking and Chesterton was writing, the Second Manifesto of 1904 had already been issued by Joseph F. Smith, and new polygamous unions had waned tremendously.  How likely is it that Elder Ward knew about post-Manifesto polygamy?  If Chesterton had been aware of post-Manifesto polygamy, how might he have written this column differently? 
  3. Chesterton raises two principal objections to Elder Ward's assurances.  One of these objections is to the careful phrasing about the "consent of the Mormon Church", which Chesterton objects "has a little the air of an official repudiating responsibility for unofficial excesses".  Chesterton goes on to lampoon this sort of strategy as here implemented.  In recent years in LDS-Evangelical dialogue, one major concern of many Evangelical parties is the seeming fixation of LDS participants on plausible deniability over whether some teaching is 'official' doctrine or not, with distantly secondary regard as to whether the teaching is believed or even true.  How has this dynamic played itself out within Latter-day Saint history over the past century?  What sorts of factors would lead one to place such a premium on the 'official'/'unofficial' dichotomy?  What are the advantages and disadvantages to such distinctions in the context of interfaith dialogue?  What criteria are often used?  What do they highlight, and what do they obscure?
  4. Chesterton's other objection is that it has only been two decades since the supposed end of polygamous practices, and at any rate, a modern implementation of such a practice must be reflective of a very different underlying moral atmosphere; and if the moral atmosphere itself is really quite different (even "repellent"), there is little cause for assurance in merely the removal of one symptomatic practice.  Does Chesterton have a good point here?  And what is it that makes Chesterton (or other non-Latter-day Saints) regard polygamy as "intolerable" and "repellent"? 
  5. Chesterton goes on to discuss a larger issue.  He argues that much historiography of his day, and much public understanding, deliberately avoids an emphasis on the 'theoretical', the understanding of a belief-system as a coherent whole that grounds the particular motivations for actual practices.  Chesterton gives several other examples, as with a history of Puritanism that avoids mentioning John Calvin.  Has the situation improved at all in our day?  Is our society more or less prone to identify the primacy of worldview issues, even religious issues, in understanding the actions of individuals and other entities?  
  6. Chesterton raises the point that "modern tolerance is deafer than intolerance".  By this statement, he means that what passes for 'tolerance' of the modern sort is often a mentality that insists on bracketing out people's actual beliefs, insisting that they be checked at the door so that we can relate to one another as bare humans or bare citizens.  However, as Chesterton points out, this is actually quite disrespectful of those beliefs; it fails to take them seriously.  Indeed, at least 'intolerance' takes the beliefs of others seriously enough to treat them as serious beliefs ought to be treated: to identify them and to seek to understand their consequences.  In light of these points, what should we make of now-modern trends toward religious pluralism, relativism, and pragmatism?  How should Latter-day Saints regard others who insist on prioritizing modern 'niceness' and 'tolerance' toward their beliefs, so that everyone is 'fine' so long as everyone keeps their beliefs to themselves and pretends that everyone agrees with this policy?  How should Evangelicals regard Latter-day Saints who take the same approach as a defense mechanism against the possibility of religious critique (and, sadly, I have met many such Latter-day Saints)?
  7. Chesterton admits that he does not have an especially astute understanding of the intricacies of Latter-day Saint theology, but he identifies its central tenet as the inherent materiality of God, and thus connects the sensation of such a belief with the determined obedience of the Latter-day Saints during their pioneer treks.  Chesterton also senses something archaically Hebraizing in the religious atmosphere cultivated by Mormonism.  Has Chesterton assessed LDS beliefs correctly?  By speaking of a Hebrew or Oriental conception, does Chesterton mean to imply that the LDS outlook actually replicates how a pre-Christian Jew might have viewed the world?  (And, if Chesterton does mean this, is he right or wrong?)  Chesterton suggests a disconnect between the LDS religious atmosphere (as he conceptualizes it) and that of the New Testament.  What aspects of the New Testament might have suggested this to him?